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POSTSCRIPT: SOME OBSERVATIONS
ABOUT GUNS AND SOVEREIGNTY
SANFORD LEVINSON∗
I
INTRODUCTION
The symposium on the Second Amendment sponsored by the Brennan
Center elicited uniformly first-rate works of scholarship. Given other
commitments and my doubts that I had anything new to say about the Second
Amendment, I volunteered instead to offer some comments by way of a
postscript to the various articles. Although each deserves careful reading and
much discussion, I am going to focus on a central theme—the concept of
sovereignty—that dominates Darrell Miller’s fascinating article and is present as
well in Saul Cornell’s.1
Sovereignty is a word that, despite all of the criticisms leveled against it by
political theorists and political scientists alike,2 simply refuses to go away; it
remains an important aspect of popular discourse and of scholarly writing,
despite the skepticism about the utility of the term in the twenty-first century.
What generates such skepticism in many cases is the empirical reality that one
can scarcely find real-world exemplars of the classical sovereign: one who is
capable of unlimited rule and is not subject even to the slightest authority of
anyone else.
Not surprisingly, this notion of sovereignty is most easily associated with
divine potentates.3 It is no coincidence that I begin my course, “Aspects of
Copyright © 2017 by Sanford Levinson.
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W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, University of
Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin. I am very grateful to Eric
Ruben and to the Brennan Center for inviting me to participate in this excellent symposium on
contemporary thinking about the Second Amendment.
1. I offered a reading course at the Harvard Law School in the fall of 2016 titled “Aspects of
Sovereignty,” and I offered a full-scale seminar with the same title in the spring of 2017 at my home
institution, the University of Texas Law School. Among other topics covered in that seminar was the
deep connection between firearms and sovereignty, the central topic of this postscript.
2. See generally DIETER GRIMM, SOVEREIGNTY: THE ORIGIN AND FUTURE OF A POLITICAL AND
LEGAL CONCEPT (Belinda Cooper trans., 2015) (offering a brief and accessible overview by a
distinguished academic and former member of the German Constitutional Court); STEPHEN D.
KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999) (presenting a classic critique of the term
sovereignty by a political scientist); SOVEREIGNTY IN FRAGMENTS (Hent Kalmo & Quentin Skinner
eds., 2010) (providing an excellent introduction to the immense challenges presented by political theorists
who are sensitive to historical changes in the use of key concepts).
3. See, e.g., JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, SOVEREIGNTY: GOD, STATE, AND SELF (2008) (arguing
that the notion of sovereignty as complete independence and self government have shaped contemporary
notions of God, state, and self).

LEVINSON_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

4/13/2017 3:45 PM

240

[Vol. 80: 239

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Sovereignty,”4 with an examination of Abraham’s apparent willingness to obey
the Divine command to sacrifice his son Isaac5 and other exemplifications of an
all-powerful God to whom nothing more than unquestioning obedience and
glorification is due. This point is powerfully made as well by the Book of Job.6 It
is not difficult to find similar materials in the two other religions linked with
Abraham, Christianity and Islam. With regard to Christianity, consider only
Jonathan Edwards’s classic sermon, Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God.
“There is nothing that keeps wicked men at any one moment out of hell,”
Edwards thundered, “but the mere pleasure of God.” It is surely not any sense of
desert. And Edwards emphasizes that “[b]y the mere pleasure of God, I mean his
sovereign pleasure, his arbitrary will, restrained by no obligation, hindered by no
manner of difficulty . . . .”7
For Islam, one can cite not only a number of Q’ranic passages,8 but also
relevant parts of Saudi, Pakistani, and Iranian constitutions.9 Religion and state
are completely joined inasmuch as these states proclaim their status as Islamic
republics with concomitant duties to be faithful to Allah’s commands. For all such
gods or instantiations of a single Abrahamic God, sovereignty is most visible
4. See supra note 1.
5. See Genesis 22:10.
6. The entire book of Job is an illustration of the arbitrary infliction of sheer power on someone
who by no plausible theory “deserves” what happens to him. Paradoxically or not, the principal inflictor
is Satan, though he can be viewed as exercising power that has been delegated to him by the “true”
sovereign—God. See, e.g., Job 1:6–12. (“Now there was a day when the sons of God came to present
themselves before the LORD, and Satan came also among them. And the LORD said to Satan, From
where come you? Then Satan answered the LORD, and said, From going to and fro in the earth, and
from walking up and down in it. And the LORD said to Satan, Have you considered my servant Job, that
there is none like him in the earth, a perfect and an upright man, one that fears God, and eschews evil?
Then Satan answered the LORD, and said, Does Job fear God for nothing? Have not you made an hedge
about him, and about his house, and about all that he has on every side? you have blessed the work of
his hands, and his substance is increased in the land. But put forth your hand now, and touch all that he
has, and he will curse you to your face. And the LORD said to Satan, Behold, all that he has is in your
power; only on himself put not forth your hand. So Satan went forth from the presence of the LORD.”).
Whatever might be said about the lessons taught by Job, it is surely not that God (or any other
“sovereign”) is necessarily just; instead, the principal lesson is that God has limitless power, which
mortals must recognize, submit to, and, indeed, praise. See also Job 41:10–11 (“. . . who then is able to
stand before me? Who hath prevented me, that I should repay him? whatsoever is under the whole
heaven is mine.”).
7. JONATHAN EDWARDS, SINNERS IN THE HANDS OF AN ANGRY GOD. A SERMON PREACHED
AT ENFIELD, JULY 8TH, 1741, AT A TIME OF GREAT AWAKENINGS AND ATTENDED WITH
REMARKABLE IMPERSSIONS ON MANY OF THE HEARERS (Reiner Smolinski ed., 1741),
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1053&context=etas [https://perma.cc/4TGGCHFV].
8. Among many verses that could be quoted are the following:
3: Al–Imran: 26 (“Say: O Allah! Owner of Sovereignty! Thou givest sovereignty unto whom Thou wilt,
and Thou withdrawest sovereignty from whom Thou wilt. Thou exaltest whom Thou wilt and Thou
abasest whom Thou wilt. In Thy hand is the good. Lo! Thou art to do all things.”); 9: At–Taubah: 116
(“Lo! Allah! Unto Him belongeth the sovereignty of the heavens and the earth. He quickeneth and He
giveth death. And ye have instead of Allah no protecting friend nor helper.”).
9. See THE CONSTITUTION OF SAUDI ARABIA, Mar. 1, 1992, arts 1, 5–8; THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN, Apr. 12, 1973, pmbl., ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
CONSTITUTION, Mar. 29–30, 1979, art. [2].
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when it generates often terrible violence with accompanying death and
destruction that is inflicted on those who would dare to question Divine
authority.10
God only rarely governs directly. Human rulers are appointed for that
purpose, and St. Paul assured his readers in the Letter to the Romans that all such
rulers are in fact the agents of God and, therefore, not to be questioned.11 How
do rulers engender proper respect among their flock? The answer is often by
inflicting public violence to both deter anyone who might be tempted to rebel
and just as importantly, to use the spectacle of violence as proof of one’s
sovereign authority.12 Thus, I think it important to look at some recent
examinations of the history of torture and capital punishment. Both involve
claims by sovereign authority to exercise complete and utter control with all of
the rights to use the object of control as the equivalent of any other chattel within
the owner’s sovereign’s domain.13
II
THE HISTORY OF SOVEREIGNTY
As Paul Kahn in particular has stressed with great eloquence, sovereignty has
since the beginning of time been associated with a willingness to kill, sacrifice, or
risk being killed (or sacrificed) while fighting the sovereigns’ wars or otherwise
fulfilling the sovereign’s desires.14 What distinguishes the sacrifices of Isaac and
Jesus is not only that the first apparently was unconsummated.15 Rather, it is that
10. For an example of eternal damnation resulting in the endless suffering obscenely set out by
Dante in the Inferno portion of what he dares to call The Divine Comedy, see DANTE, THE DIVINE
COMEDY, BOOK I: INFERNO (Clive James ed., 2013) (1307).
11. See Romans 13:1–3 (“Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no
authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God.
Consequently, whoever rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and
those who do so will bring judgment on themselves.”).
12. See, e.g., Numbers 16 (describing the infliction of death and destruction as the exemplification
of divine sovereignty when God causes an earthquake to swallow up Koreh and his followers who dared
to challenge the authority of Moses as God’s singular agent).
13. See, e.g., ZERO DARK THIRTY (Columbia Pictures 2013) (where an interrogator, Daniel, states
to Amar, the prisoner, “I own you, Amar. You belong to me.”). To belong to someone is to be a slave,
to be entirely subject to someone claiming sovereign power over oneself. Incidentally, this is what made
Roger Taney’s assertion in Dred Scott that blacks had no rights that whites “[were] bound to respect” so
telling. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857). He did not say that blacks as a matter of legal reality
had no rights anywhere in the United States. Surely that was false. Instead, he claimed that any such
rights were by sufferance of those who were exclusively sovereign within the United States, who by
Taney’s account could include no black people at all. What the sovereign whites gave, they could take
away in an instant. Again, that’s just what sovereignty entails. To say otherwise is to assert that they are
not really sovereign, for they have only limited powers. From one perspective, all constitutionalism,
insofar as it tries to limit rather than simply enable power, is a critique of sovereign authority.
14. See PAUL KAHN, SACRED VIOLENCE, TORTURE, TERROR, AND SOVEREIGNTY 21–41 (2008).
Kahn also emphasizes the willingness to accept one’s own sacrifice in the name of sovereign command.
This willingness is exemplified by Isaac’s and Jesus’ readiness to sacrifice themselves. See Genesis 22:10;
Romans 3:25.
15. But see SHALOM SPIEGEL, THE LAST TRIAL: ON THE LEGENDS AND LORE OF THE COMMAND
TO OFFER ISAAC AS A SACRIFICE, 60–61 (Judah Goldi trans., 1993) (suggesting from a collection of
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Abraham was apparently prepared to do his nefarious deed in private or, perhaps
more to the point, before the one and only audience that counted: God.16 In
contrast, Jesus was publicly crucified in order to illustrate the purported
sovereign power of Rome,17 and it was important that an extensive and largely
unsympathetic audience could observe the humiliation of the ostensible messiah
and his unimaginable suffering on the cross. David Garland, in his outstanding
book on capital punishment, notes the public character of that form of state
violence at least into the eighteenth century.18 In its own way, the carnival-like
spectacle glorified the claims to authority of the monarchs ordering it, often in
the name of God.19
Carl Schmitt famously, or infamously, suggested that sovereign power can be
identified by asking who can declare a state of exception to ordinary law that may
result in turning the normal legal universe upside down.20 Perhaps we might
amend that to include the ability of the would-be sovereign, in addition to naming
the state of exception, to also order the infliction of death and mayhem on those
regarded as enemies21 and impose the risk of being killed or suffering torture
while in the service of the sovereign.
III
MODERN SOVEREIGNTY
Does it matter that the dominant concepts of sovereignty shift over the
centuries with the contemporary states often relying on the myth of popular
sovereignty instead of obeisance to monarchs who claim the divine right of kings?
Why exactly does that make a crucial difference, save in the rhetoric of politics?
After all, those who proclaim that they legitimately rule because they are the
chosen representatives of We the People22 or who otherwise instantiate the
people as a Leninist vanguard are faced with the same dilemmas and temptations
that all other rulers face. How do contemporary rulers, as ordinary human beings,
manage to persuade others that they enjoy the trappings of sovereign power
against those who might resist their claims? As H.L.A. Hart famously argued, the
difference between the gun-brandishing thief and the tax collector boils down to
Jewish stories that Abraham did slay his son).
16. See Genesis 22:10.
17. See Romans 3:25.
18. See DAVID W. GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE
OF ABOLITION 75–87 (2010) (characterizing the public death penalty as a way to promote state interests
from 1400 to 1700).
19. See id. at 84–87 (arguing that monarchs used ritual gestures and symbols to create connections
to spiritual authority).
20. See CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 5 (George Schwab trans., 2006) (defining sovereignty as whoever can pronounce and
bring into effect the state of exception).
21. Schmitt’s emphasis on the importance of “the enemy” is at the heart of his book. See CARL
SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 26 (1996) (“The specific political distinction to which
political actions can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.”).
22. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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an internal feeling of obligation based on complex “rules of recognition” that
connect the collector, unlike the thief, to someone or to some institution that is
in fact licensed to issue commands that ought to be obeyed.23 Most persons
undoubtedly do not consciously wish to imagine themselves as criminals doing
the wrong thing, but under the cloak of an institution they are not criminals but
civil servants.
Consider Daniel, an American about to interrogate a suspected terrorist,
Amar, at the beginning of the movie Zero Dark Thirty, which examines
American practices of interrogation in the Afghanistan and Iraqi wars.24 Daniel
no doubt believes that he is simply being a loyal American attempting to serve
the public interest by defending the community against what was defined as the
global war on and against terrorism. As Mark Osiel so powerfully pointed out in
his own study of the Dirty War in Argentina, at least some of those who tortured
others did not immediately believe they were doing the right thing.25 They had to
be persuaded by a mixture of political leaders, generals within the military, and
priests that they were serving abstract justice and the higher interests of the
Argentine people.
More than a quarter century ago, I suggested that there is a deep tension
between Anglo-American civic republican political theory and a far more statist
theory identified especially with the German sociologist Max Weber.26 He
contended that force is legitimate only “so far as it is either permitted by the state
or prescribed by it.”27 Weber notably argued that “[t]he claim of the modern state
to monopolize the use of force is as essential to it as its character of compulsory
jurisdiction and continuous organization.”28 I argued instead that Weber’s
definition was not in fact truly analytic, but was instead a contingent description
of only some states rather than of all modern states.29 At least some versions of
both civic republican and liberal theory placed legitimate use of the means of
violence in a political community that was privileged to hold ostensible
sovereigns accountable ultimately by exercising their right to attempt the violent
overthrow of tyrannical sovereigns.30
23. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 96 (3d ed. 2012).
24. See ZERO DARK THIRTY supra, note 13.
25. See Mark Osiel, The Mental State of Torturers: Argentina’s Dirty War, in TORTURE 133 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 2006). See generally MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, ORDINARY EVIL, AND HANNAH
ARENDT (2002) (examining the social conditions and personal justifications used by high-ranking
officials in Argentina’s Dirty War); MARK OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS (1999) (arguing that enlarging the
role of legal counsel would help ground professional ideals for conduct in the military with morality and
thus decrease mass atrocity).
26. See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 637–59 (1989).
27. See MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 156 (T. Parsons
ed., A.M. Henderson & T. Parsons trans., 1947).
28. Id.
29. Levinson, supra note 26, at 650.
30. See, e.g., RICHARD UVILLER AND WILLIAM MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS,
OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002), reviewed in Sanford Levinson, Superb
History, Dubious Constitutional and Political Theory: Comments on Uviller and Merkel, The Militia and
the Right to Arms, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 315, 315–33 (2004).
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The most noteworthy example of such a rejection of ordinary sovereign
authority, for Americans, is the American Revolution. It was actually a violent
secession from the British Empire with the justification proffered in the
Declaration of Independence. Most judges at the time, who had been appointed
by the Crown, likely recognized the sovereignty of the King in Parliament
following the Glorious Revolution of 1688. This was also true, no doubt, of many
well-trained lawyers, even as others—those we now deem patriots or founders of
the new nation—ended up rejecting British sovereignty in the name of their new
popular sovereignty. The arguments made at that time have penumbras and
emanations that resonate even in our own time. Consider in this context Edward
Abbey’s emendation of the famous bumper sticker that when guns are outlawed,
only criminals will have guns. That is demonstrably false, even as a conceptual
matter. As Abbey put it, “If guns are outlawed, only the government will have
guns.”31 Whether one would welcome or instead be horrified by this prospect
defines a fundamental cleavage in contemporary American politics, usually
expressed, whether cogently or not, in arguments about the Second Amendment.
IV
SOVEREIGNTY’S EFFECT ON THE RIGHT TO CARRY ARMS THROUGHOUT
HISTORY
Both Darrell Miller’s examination of medieval English law and theory32 and
Saul Cornell’s references to the importance of the king’s peace in understanding
the limits of any right to carry arms in old England and their American colonies33
help us understand the degree to which we live in decidedly different times that
operate under quite different assumptions. Both underscore the importance of
historical perspective, best expressed, perhaps, in L. P. Hartley’s famous
statement at the beginning of his 1953 novel The Go Between: “The past is a
foreign country; they do things differently there.”34 It is important to be attentive
to these differences even as we might wish also to recognize certain continuities
between past and present. From earliest times, individuals have never been freely
authorized to kill one another. For example, the Sixth Commandment prohibited
killing.35 But the conventional reading of this commandment is that it prohibits
only murder—the taking of life by private individuals. God has no compunctions
about killing those who are perceived as opponents of Divine authority, a view
that is maintained by those who see themselves as instantiations of such
authority.36 One can act in service of the sovereign in ways that would be
31. Levinson, supra note 26, at 650 (citing EDWARD ABBEY, ABBEY’S ROAD 130 (1991)) .
32. See Darrell A. H. Miller, Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and the State, 80 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 2, 2017, at 87–91.
33. See generally Saul Cornell, The Right to Keep and Carry Arms in Anglo-American Law,
Preserving Liberty and Keeping the Peace, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017.
34. L. P. HARTLEY, THE GO BETWEEN 9 (1953).
35. See Exodus 20:13.
36. This is not to deny the presence of radically pacifistic readings of the text, especially with regard
to the authority of humans to kill one another. See generally STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE
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forbidden if only private ends were at stake. Thus Miller’s careful reconstruction
of the difference between the privileged taking of life while serving the sovereign
monarch and those takings of life that required royal pardon is illuminating. It
demonstrates the profound difference between the sensibility of the England that
he is writing about and that drawn upon by Justice Scalia in his Heller opinion37
that rested the Second Amendment on a desire to privilege private individuals
when engaging in self-defense.
Many contemporary defenders of a robust Second Amendment are
themselves devotees of libertarian natural rights. One need not necessarily reject
that political philosophy in order to believe that it has almost nothing in common
with the political theory so well delineated by Miller and alluded to by Cornell as
well.38 If one begins with notions of states-of-nature from which individuals
emerge in order to protect their personal security, an emphasis on a right of selfdefense makes a lot of sense. Why would individuals forego the right to protect
themselves by having access to guns and then using them, if need be,39 to kill those
who appear to threaten that security? If this were the case, then why would it be
necessary to receive the king’s pardon after engaging in individual self-defense,
whereas no pardon was necessary if death had been inflicted while defending the
monarch or some cause favored by the monarch? One could ask similar questions
about the priority of preserving the king’s peace over preserving one’s individual
security. Hobbes and Locke are important historical personages in part because
of the role they played in overthrowing a prior political consciousness and
creating what we might wish to term a more modern understanding of politics.
But the fact that we might even view that understandng as based on self-evident
truths does not mean that these ostensible truths were grasped or accepted by
prior generations, just as there are those who contest them today. That past was
a different country; Miller, especially, is writing about an age when the divine
right of kings was still taken seriously and the Lockean critique of tyrannical
monarchs was almost literally unthinkable.40

KINGDOM (1991). Not to mention the various Quaker, Mennonite, and other courageous enactors such
commitments during times of war. Still, the point is that they are a decided minority even among those
who profess to take the Sixth Commandment seriously. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours,
FIRST THINGS (May 2002), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2002/05/gods-justice-and-ours [https://
perma.cc/4R2Q-XZSB]. Scalia quotes Paul’s letter to the Romans and its argument that “government—
however you want to limit that concept—derives its moral authority from God. It is the ‘minister of God’
with powers to ‘revenge,’ to ‘execute wrath,’ including even wrath by the sword (which is unmistakably
a reference to the death penalty). Paul of course did not believe that the individual possessed any such
powers. Only a few lines before this passage, he wrote, ‘Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but rather
give place unto wrath: for it is written, Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord.’ And in this world
the Lord repaid—did justice—through His minister, the state.’” For Scalia, “[t]hese passages from
Romans represent the consensus of Western thought until very recent times,” and it is fair to say that
Scalia did not himself reject it.
37. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
38. See Miller, supra note 32, at 95; Cornell, supra note 33, at 39.
39. At least from the perspective of the scared individual.
40. Miller, supra note 32, at 87–93.
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I believe that Miller indisputably demonstrates that the common law
background of a right not only to bear arms, but more importantly, to use them
for one of their intended functions—the killing of other human beings—is closely
connected to recognition of the primacy of the sovereign monarch. “Early selfdefense law in the Anglo-American tradition presumed that homicide—even in
self-defense—required the pardon of the sovereign.”41 He quotes another scholar
for the proposition that “private citizens have power to execute their judgment
‘only insofar as they stand in the shoes of public officials to whom this authority
belongs.’”42 It is not the case that individuals were necessarily prevented from
using their firearms to kill; rather, they had to point to some authorization from
the sovereign, most commonly, impressment into the king’s service in order to
fight a war or embark on a religious crusade to recapture the Holy Land. As is
true today, those clothed with public authority are entitled to use deadly force
against those perceived as enemies of the state. Or, to be a bit more precise,
perhaps, it may take relatively little to clothe police officers with immunity from
any prosecution when, for example, they are accused, at least in the court of
public opinion, of employing unjustified deadly force with regard to young
African-American males.43 But at least we might take cold comfort in the fact
that one had to be an actual police officer. There is a reason that we usually refer
to those who are not clothed with such authority as vigilantes or members of
lynch mobs without the same entitlement to immunity from prosecution.44 The
tin star or other badge signifying public office still seems to matter, and we might
ask exactly why this is the case.
The answer can perhaps be found in the most important sentence in Miller’s
article, which is his reminder that “[t]he common law of self-defense doesn’t
begin with the individual, it begins with the sovereign.”45 And one of the most
important duties or prerogatives of the sovereign was precisely to establish a
“king’s peace” that would supplant not only “the patchwork of local regulations,”
but also “private vengeances [] and family feuds” that were too often present.46
But this scarcely brought an end to killing or torture. Instead, there developed a
sharp distinction between justifiable homicide—“those [killings] expressly
ordered by the crown”47—and what was merely excusable homicide, the latter of
which we today call self-defense. The clearest example of justifiable homicide is
the executioner’s lopping off the head of a poor wretch (or, perhaps, Sir Thomas

41. Id. at 86.
42. Id. at 87 (quoting Malcolm Thorburn, Justification, Powers, and Authority, 117 YALE L.J. 1070,
1126 (2008) (emphasis added)).
43. Julia Craven, More than 250 People were Killed by Police in 2016, HUFFINGTON POST (July 7,
2016, 9:45 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/black-people-killed-by-police-america_us_
577da633e4b0c590f7e7fb17.
44. Save, of course, in “stand your ground” states that maximize the ability of private individuals to
claim a privilege to kill anyone deemed threatening to them.
45. Miller, supra note 32, at 87.
46. Id. at 87–88.
47. Id. at 88.
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Moore or Anne Boleyn) who had been sentenced by a monarch’s magistrate to
die. But this would also apply to those “happy few”48 who accompanied Henry V
to Agincourt and happily slaughtered the hapless French soldiers opposing them.
To be sure, it was not always easy to discern exactly when one was standing
in the shoes of the sovereign, especially when it became the case that one could
engage in “justifiable homicide” when trying “to arrest a manifest felon” or an
“outlaw” attempting to resist arrest.49 But the point, as Miller summarizes, is that
“[h]omicide was justified only when one acted as an actual or implicit agent of
the sovereign.”50 In that case, acquittal was the proper verdict for a defendant
charged with homicide who could establish such agency. That was not the case
for someone whose claim was only what we would call self-defense, unconnected
with a truly public purpose. In that case, acquittal was improper even if many
such killers were pardoned by a merciful sovereign willing, perhaps, to recognize
the justice of taking the law into one’s own hands. But there is no doubt that the
law emanated from sovereign authority, not from the views of any individual that
he was genuinely entitled to kill. Not until 1828 did Parliament officially eliminate
the functional difference between homicide on behalf of the law and homicide in
self-defense.51 Perhaps what legal sociologists call the “law in the books” finally
caught up with the “law in action” insofar as it had basically become routine for
those who killed in self-defense to escape punishment.52 But this should not
license us to ignore the profound shift in consciousness that accompanies
placement of such power in the hands of individuals. Consider the implications
of Sir Matthew Hale’s 1736 statement that “private persons are not trusted to
take capital revenge on each other,”53 which Miller, like Weber, interprets as
standing for the proposition “that the king is to monopolize violence.”54
A revolution (or secession) took place in the United States in the half-century
after Hale wrote his words, but it did not at all settle the question of sovereignty

48. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY THE FIFTH act 4, sc. 3
(“And Crispin Crispian shall ne’er go by,
From this day to the ending of the world,
But we in it shall be rememberedWe few, we happy few, we band of brothers;
For he to-day that sheds his blood with me
Shall be my brother; be he ne’er so vile,
This day shall gentle his condition;
And gentlemen in England now-a-bed
Shall think themselves accurs’d they were not here,
And hold their manhoods cheap whiles any speaks
That fought with us upon Saint Crispin’s day.”)
49. Miller, supra note 32, at 88.
50. Id. at 89.
51. Id.
52. See Jean-Louis Halperin, Law in Books and Law in Action: The Problem of Legal Change, 64
ME. L. REV. 46 (2011).
53. SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS TO THE CROWN 481 (W.A. Stokes & E.
Ingersall eds., 1847).
54. Miller, supra note 32, at 90.
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other than to displace any notion that it was embodied in a monarch. Instead, the
Revolution—and the Constitution afterward—were based on the power of the
people to exercise control over their own fate. But the central question is the
degree to which the people—or the representatives, whose authority was based
on speaking on behalf of and with the consent of the people—could exercise the
control formerly granted kings or queens. What precisely does popular
sovereignty mean?
An old maxim, “the voice of the people is the voice of God,” denounced in a
796 letter from Alcuin to Charlemagne, took on a much more affirmative
valence.55 Some might interpret this as simply an assertion that God speaks
through the voice of the majority, which maintains a strong link to more
traditional notions of Divine sovereignty; others, less sectarian, might suggest
that we can have no real idea what God might desire or even if there is a God,
and that the authority once assigned to God should instead now be assigned to
the voice of the people. In either case there will be significant difficulties in
identifying the people who count as authoritative.
Does this refer, for example, only to a unanimous declaration by the relevant
people as to some proposition, with even one dissent making any claim of
overriding authority invalid? Or, on the other hand, do we accept some notion of
majority or super-majority rule even at the price of overriding the good-faith
objections of those who dissent?56 We know beyond a shadow of a doubt that
those who framed the Constitution, ordained in the name of the people, were
indifferent to the inevitable reality of disagreement, so long as it did not become
large enough to capture control of a given convention charged with ratifying the
Constitution. After all, there was not a hint of a suggestion that the 30-27 vote in
New York rendered illegitimate that state’s ratification of the Constitution. To
be sure, neither Rhode Island nor North Carolina was in the Union when George
Washington was inaugurated on April 30, 1789;57 that is evidence, though, only
for the proposition that each state did have to assent, as a corporate entity, before
being bound by the new Constitution. But anti-Federalist minorities within the
states were out of luck. The point of this excursus into American constitutional
history is to establish that popular or even state sovereignty has almost nothing
in it for individual dissidents.
This is one reason that many supported what became known as the Bill of
Rights, which includes the Second Amendment. Yet all but the most devoted
partisans agree that the Amendment is less than self-evident in its meaning and
55. See, Alcuin, Letter from Alcuin to Charlemagne, in THE LIBRARY OF THE WORLD’S BEST
LITERATURE. AN ANTHOLOGY IN THIRTY VOLUMES (C.D. Warner ed., 1917), http://www.bartleby.
com/library/prose/135.html [https://perma.cc/KAQ5-3SH6].
56. See, e.g., MELISSA SCHWARTZBERG, COUNTING THE MANY (2013) (challenging the rationale
behind the use of supermajority rule as an alternative to majority decisionmaking).
57. See Observing Constitution Day, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.archives.
gov/education/lessons/constitution-day/ratification.html [https://perma.cc/69RS-K2DX] (noting that
neither state had ratified the Constitution, which seems a condition precedent to being part of the newly
created United States).
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that it is we who must construct, from the available historical and other materials,
an Amendment that quite literally we can live with in the twenty-first century.
And, not surprisingly, it continues to be the case that notions of sovereignty are
central to the meaning we might wish to assign to the Amendment.
V
THE CONTEMPORARY INTERSECTION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND BEARING ARMS
Many contemporary proponents of a maximalist view of the Amendment,
including that articulated in Scalia’s Heller opinion,58 can be described as
libertarians, a position defined by its opposition to all but the most minimal state.
This is certainly true of Randy Barnett, a vigorous and articulate defender both
of libertarianism and of what has come to be called the individual rights view of
the Second Amendment.59 Barnett founds much of his constitutional and political
philosophy on a debatable reading of the Declaration of Independence and a
more plausible reading of the opinions of Chief Justice Jay and Justice James
Wilson in Chisholm v. Georgia.60 These distinguished justices unequivocally
rejected “state sovereignty” in favor of a more individualized notion of
sovereignty. For Barnett, “the people” means what he repeatedly refers to as
“the people as individuals, each and every one.”61 With respect to the
Declaration, Barnett, like many Americans, focuses almost exclusively on the
notion that each individual has an equal and inalienable right to “life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness” that, by definition, cannot be abridged by the state.62
Indeed, it might even comprise tyranny for the state to do so. This reading is used
to support Barnett’s strong insistence on the ontological existence of “natural
rights” (and our epistemological abilities to discern exactly what they are),
though he does not seem to ground those rights on a Creator instead of, say, a
capacity given all reasoning beings to discern the teachings of “natural law.”63
In any event, Barnett’s version of the Declaration leads to an individualist,
near-anarchist, account that requires a quite radical revision of what the
Declaration at its beginning might mean by reference to “the one people.”64 It is
this collective entity who seceded from the British Empire and in doing so, were
decidedly non-unanimous, given the plethora of Loyalists who opposed
58. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). Putting to one side the obvious fact that
Scalia simply announced, without anything resembling a genuine argument, that most federal constraints
on the possession of firearms continued to be constitutional.
59. See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION (2016) (arguing that
“We the People” should be interpreted as individual rights and protect against abuses by the majority);
Randy E. Barnett, We the People: Each and Every One, 123 YALE L.J. 2576, 2579–87, 2593–96 (2014)
(critiquing Bruce Ackerman’s view that a supermajority can, without a formal constitutional amendment,
override the text of the Constitution that is meant to protect individual rights).
60. Chrisholm, Ex’r v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
61. See BARNETT, supra note 59, at 68.
62. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
63. See BARNETT, supra note 59, at 37 (emphasizing the importance of “natural law”).
64. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (“When in the course of human
events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands . . .” (emphasis added)).
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secession. There are more than a few overtones in Barnett’s approach of
Margaret Thatcher’s famous statement that “there is no such thing [as society]!
There are [only] individual men and women.”65
It is much easier to defend a strong view of individual gun rights, whether
predicated on the Second Amendment or on a theory of natural rights, if one
ignores the claims of the surrounding social order and polity, whether
instantiated in the national government or, in what the Supreme Court continues
to refer to as “sovereign states.”66 Thus, in what I have termed “the best ninepage opinion ever written,”67 Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Frank
Easterbrook notes that traditional conservatives had often supported the ability
of states to use their police power to vindicate what was thought to be the health
and safety of the general populace, even if this required some limitation of
individual rights.68 Easterbrook concludes his opinion by quoting Brandeis’s
hoary chestnut about states as laboratories of experiment,69 thus throwing the
federalism gauntlet before, say, Justice Kennedy, who often writes of the dignity
of states and the necessity of federal courts to protect that dignity against those
who would unduly limit state autonomy.70 The penultimate line of Easterbrook’s
remarkable opinion, “Federalism is an older and more deeply rooted tradition
than is a right to carry any particular kind of weapon,”71 turns federalism into just
another form of statism—and sovereignty—with a potential for curbing the kind
of radical individualism that Barnett and other libertarians exalt.
To put it mildly, the contemporary Supreme Court has no coherent notion of
sovereignty, however often it uses the word in its opinions. The Supreme Court
majority’s disdain for federalism in McDonald72 is in some tension with all of the
65. See Margaret Thatcher, Aids, Education, and the Year 2000! (“there is no such thing as society”)
WOMAN’S OWN (Oct. 31, 1987), http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689 [https://perma.cc
/BN8G-GF2F] (conceding that there also existed “families,” which generates profound problems for
libertarian theory more generally); Sanford Levinson, Randy Barnett’s Critique of Democracy (and John
Marshall?), 32 CONST. COMMENT. 113 (2017).
66. See Mark Killenbeck, Political Facts, Legal Fictions, in NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION IN
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 223 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2016) (analyzing the use of “state
sovereignty” rhetoric by the modern Supreme Court).
67. See Sandy Levinson, The Best Nine-Page Opinion Ever Written!, BALKINIZATION BLOG (June
12, 2009, 5:34 PM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/best-nine-page-opinion-ever-written.html
[https://perma.cc/L6MA-D8Q6].
68. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of America v. Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2009).
69. Id. at 860. His opinion was joined, incidentally, by his formidable colleague Richard Posner.
70. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) (Maine protected against suit even within its own
courts for violation of a federal law because “[t]he federal system established by our Constitution
preserves the sovereign status of the States in two ways. First, it reserves to them a substantial portion of
the Nation’s primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that
status.”).
71. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of America, 567 F. 3d at 857.
72. McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Sanchez-Valle, 136 S. Ct.
1863, 1870 (2016) (Justice Kagan conceding the lack of a truly coherent notion of sovereignty. “Truth be
told, however, ‘sovereignty’ in this context does not bear its ordinary meaning. For whatever reason, the
test we have devised to decide whether two governments are distinct for double jeopardy purposes
overtly disregards common indicia of sovereignty.”); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215 (2004) (“As
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cases that sing praises to federalism in the name of the retained “sovereignty”
and “dignity” of the states.73 One might say that this incoherence is built into the
very notion of constitutionalism, with its promise of “limited sovereignty” at least
when referring to agencies of government even as the specter of “popular
sovereignty,” whatever that means exactly, hovers in the background.74
Justice Blackmun at the end of his career announced that he would no longer
collaborate in the “machinery of death,”75 thereby formally renouncing any
participation in what has historically been one of the most telling appurtenances
of sovereignty. Many of us commend him for doing so, but perhaps we should
realize that the most important mechanism of death in the modern United States
is indeed firearms. One might defend the private possession of firearms, as I have
been willing to do myself.76 But that does not lessen the fundamental reality of
the linkage between guns and death. That, in turn, should remind us that the
ability to kill is a classic attribute of sovereignty. The “sovereign” who can be
defined by the capacity to declare the “state of exception,” to recall Schmitt’s
formation, can transform murder into legitimate killing.77 Whether it is the state
or the individual who claims such a privilege may be almost irrelevant from the
perspective of those who suffer the imposition of the specific violence. But even
those of us who are onlookers, so to speak, neither directly inflicting the violence
nor bearing its brunt, have reason to be concerned about the circumstances of its
occurrence given both the moral questions surrounding them and the sheer
political and social consequences for the societies we live in.

this case should make clear,” wrote Justice Thomas in a concurring opinion, “the time has come to
reexamine the premises and logic of our tribal sovereignty cases. It seems to me that much of the
confusion reflected in our precedent arises from two largely incompatible and doubtful assumptions.
First, Congress (rather than some other part of the Federal Government) can regulate virtually every
aspect of the tribes without rendering tribal sovereignty a nullity. Second, the Indian tribes retain
inherent sovereignty to enforce their criminal laws against their own members.”).
73. For a canvas of some recent relevant cases, see Killenbeck, supra note 67.
74. See generally RICHARD TUCK, THE SLEEPING SOVEREIGN (2015).
75. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994).
76. See Levinson, Why Didn’t the Supreme Court Take My Advice in the Heller Case? Some
Speculative Responses to an Egocentric Question, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1491, 1495 (2009).
77. See CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 5 (George Schwab trans., 2006).

